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Information Technology and Fiscal Capacity in a Developing Country: 
Evidence from Ethiopia 
	
Merima Ali, Abdulaziz Shifa, Abebe Shimeles and Firew Woldeyes 
	
	
Summary 
	
Governments in developing countries are typically constrained by a limited fiscal capacity to 
finance the provision of essential public goods – a constraint that has been cited as one of 
the fundamental challenges to economic development. Several developing countries have 
recently implemented electronic tax systems (ETS) to improve monitoring tax compliance 
using modern information technology (such as electronic sales registry machines (ESRMs)). 
Despite the widespread adoption of ETS throughout the developing world, there is a dearth 
of systematic evidence on its impact. In this paper, we document the impact of ETS using 
quasi-experimental evidence from Ethiopia – a low-income country in Sub-Saharan Africa 
which expanded use of ESRMs in recent years. We use administrative data covering the 
entire set of those registered for Value Added Tax (VAT) in Ethiopia. We find that ETS 
resulted in a large and significant increase in VAT payments (of about 20 log points). We 
also find evidence that the effect is driven primarily by firms that are more likely to evade 
taxes prior to ETS adoption, suggesting that ETS has minimised tax evasion. 
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Introduction 
 
Economic development requires a state capable of mobilising fiscal resources to finance the 
provision of essential public goods – a capacity that many developing countries lack (Bird 
1980; Tanzi and Zee 2000). In 2006, for example, the average GDP share of government 
revenue in low-income countries was 12.1 per cent. However, for high-income OECD 
countries, the figure stood at 25.2 per cent – twice as high as for low-income countries.1 
Thus, weak fiscal capacity of the state has received increased attention in the political 
economics of development (Besley and Persson 2010; Besley and Persson 2011; Acemoglu 
2005). Tax enforcement requires gathering detailed earnings information on a large number 
of taxpayers. Governments with a bare minimum of tax administration infrastructure, as is 
typically the case in developing countries, find it costly to monitor earnings and enforce tax 
compliance. 
 
Advances in information technology (IT) offer a cheaper possibility for gathering and 
analysing a large amount of data on taxpayers. This has caught the attention of tax 
authorities throughout developing countries as they attempt to improve fiscal capacity. In an 
extensive survey of reforms, Bird and Zolt (2008) note that over recent decades ‘reform 
efforts in tax administration in developing countries have generally centered on information 
technology (IT)’. Nevertheless, there has been little, if any, systematic empirical evidence on 
the impact of those reforms. In this study, using administrative firm-level panel data on a 
large number of business taxpayers, we provide evidence on the impact of using electronic 
sales registry machines (ESRMs) on tax compliance in the context of a developing country. 
We study a recent reform to expand the use of ESRMs in Ethiopia – a Sub-Saharan African 
country with one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world and minimal fiscal capacity. 
 
Starting in 2008, the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA) – the equivalent of 
the Internal Revenue Service in the US – required several businesses to use ESRMs.	The 
programme has been rolled out over many rounds. The machines register sales and issue 
receipts (printouts of an electronic receipt). The transactions are reported instantly via a 
network to an ERCA server. Hence, once a firm starts using ESRMs, ERCA receives real-
time data on the firm’s revenue. Harsh legal punishments, both financial and long jail terms, 
have been enacted to discourage failure to issue electronic receipts. The availability of real-
time data on firms’ revenue provides ERCA with the possibility of monitoring reported 
revenue on a daily basis. This would have been prohibitively expensive and virtually 
impossible with traditional paper-based receipts. 
 
ERCA has given us access to a unique and confidential administrative dataset on taxpayers. 
Our dataset contains information on the amount of VAT paid by firms. Introduced in 2003, 
VAT is the single largest component of domestic indirect tax. Over the past five years, for 
example, VAT contributed nearly half of indirect domestic tax and one-fifth of total domestic 
tax. Our dataset also has information on the date each taxpayer started using ESRMs. The 
use of ESRMs started with a few hundred taxpayers in 2008, and gradually expanded. We 
analyse nearly 60,000 taxpayers that have used ESRMs. The fact that the programme was 
rolled out over several rounds provides us with a useful opportunity to estimate the impact of 
ESRM use while controlling for potential biases that may arise from time-invariant firm-
specific factors and changes in overall trends. 
 
We find two major patterns in the data. First, the average amount of VAT paid by firms 
increases substantially after adoption of ESRMs. Secondly, this effect is driven by firms that 
were more likely to evade taxes prior to ESRM use – suggesting that ESRM use has 
																																																													
1  The figures are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) online database, accessed 28 June 2014. 
The definition of high-income OECD and low-income countries follows the World Bank categorisation. 
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increased tax compliance by businesses that would have been likely to evade prior to the 
introduction of ESRMs. Analysis of trends in the lead-up to ESRM use suggests that these 
effects are unlikely to be explained by pre-existing differences between ESRM users and 
non-users. 
 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on fiscal capacity of the state and tax 
compliance in developing countries. One of the important challenges for tax authorities in 
developing countries is a lack of accurate information on earnings (Engel et al. 2001; Fisman 
and Wei 2004; Olken and Singhal 2011; Carrillo and Emran 2010; Gordon and Li 2009; 
Boadway and Sato 2009). This motivated a number of recent studies that assess alternative 
policy tools to supply more reliable information to tax authorities. Generally the studies 
examine the impact of third-party information to verify the accuracy of earnings reported by 
taxpayers and to minimise tax evasion [see e.g. Pomeranz 2013; Carrillo et al. 2014; 
Slemrod 2008; Kumler et al. 2013; Naritomi 2013]. Even though governments in many 
developing countries are using electronic tax systems (ETS) to improve their ability to gather, 
analyse and monitor earnings information, we are not aware of any study that examines their 
impact – a gap that our study attempts to narrow. 
 
Our paper is also related to the literature on the impact of IT on economic outcomes. These 
studies have mostly focused on the effect of IT on private sector productivity (Bresnahan et 
al. 2002; Stiroh 2002; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000). Despite widespread adoption of IT in 
public service delivery, commonly known as e-governance, assessing its impact remains a 
relatively unexplored area (Garicano and Heaton 2010). Our study documents empirical 
evidence on IT and public service delivery in the context of a developing economy. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 we discuss the institutional background to 
taxation in Ethiopia. This is followed by a simple theoretical framework in Section 2 to guide 
our empirical analysis. After describing the data in Section 3, we report the empirical results 
in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5. 
 
 
1  Background to taxation in Ethiopia 
 
Our dataset comes from Ethiopia, a country that was ravaged by a long civil war during the 
Cold War era, which still remains one of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2010 
Ethiopia’s GDP per capita was about US$1,000 in current purchasing power parity. For 
comparison, this figure is about only one-third of the average in Sub-Saharan Africa, and less 
than one-thirtieth of the OECD average.2 
 
A relative stability and several economic reforms followed once the civil war ended in the 
early 1990s. One area of reform has been taxation. The need for fiscal resources was 
apparent in the lack of basic public infrastructure, such as the roads that are needed to 
connect markets across the country. However, as can be seen in Figure 1, the difference 
between tax collection and the government’s need for fiscal resources has resulted in a 
substantial gap between tax revenue and government expenditure. The gap seems to have 
steadily reduced mostly due to declining expenditure. Tax revenue as a share of GDP stayed 
stable, at a relatively low level of 12 per cent. 
 
  
																																																													
2  Source: WDI online DataBank accessed 13 July 2014. The per capita GDP for OECD, Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Ethiopia, respectively, is US$34,483, US$3,056 and US$1,041. 
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Figure 1 Government revenue and expenditure 2001-2011 (% GDP) 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
 
As is the case with many developing countries that lack a broad tax base, Ethiopia relied 
heavily on taxes on international trade – a kind of tax that is relatively easy to enforce but 
probably more distortionary to the economy. Figure 2 plots government revenue from taxes 
on international trade as a percentage of total tax revenue. Over the past decade, the 
government raised more than 40 per cent of its tax revenue from international trade – a very 
high ratio even by the standard of developing countries. About one-third of the revenue 
comes from income taxes. 
 
Figure 2 Government tax revenue by source (% total tax revenue) 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. 
	
It is against this background that several reforms to improve the tax system have been 
implemented. The reforms can be categorised into two broad aspects: (1) introducing new 
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taxes to broaden the domestic tax base, and (2) improving the administrative capacity of the 
tax authority. One of the major reforms that aimed at broadening the domestic tax base was 
the introduction in 2003 of VAT– the major variable of interest in our empirical analysis. VAT 
has now become a significant source of government revenue, contributing nearly one-fifth of 
total domestic tax revenue and half of indirect tax revenue over recent years. The VAT rate 
has been set at 15 per cent since it was introduced. 
 
When it comes to the second reform, namely improving the administrative capacity of the tax 
authority, the focus of government’s investment has been greater use of IT in tax 
administration. The first significant IT investment took place in 2004, with the implementation 
of an integrated electronic database to manage records on taxpayers called the Standard 
Integrated Government Tax Administration System (SIGTAS).3 The database aims to 
minimise the cost of maintaining, retrieving and analysing data on taxes and taxpayers. Our 
data is extracted from this database at ERCA.  
 
The second significant use of IT in Ethiopia’s tax system – and the focus of this study – came 
in 2008, with the introduction of electronic sales registry machines (ESRMs). The machines 
record sales and print out receipts. Moreover, the ESRMs are connected through a general 
packet radio service to ERCA’s central database, providing real-time data on each 
transaction. Thus, the use of ESRMs has essentially enabled ERCA to monitor reported 
revenue on a day-to-day basis – something that would have been prohibitively expensive 
and virtually impossible with traditional paper-based reporting. 
	
	
2  A simple framework 
 
In this section we present a version of the stylised models of tax evasion, albeit structured to 
help us guide our empirical specification and interpret the results.4 We are interested in 
analysing the impact of implementation of ESRMs. Thus, we first describe the economic 
environment prior to introduction of ESRMs. We will then introduce use of ESRMs and show 
the effect. 
 
2.1 The environment prior to introduction of ESRMs 
 
Consider an economy with many firms, where each firm is indexed by ݆ ∈ ሼ0,1ሻ. Assume that 
the statutory tax rate on the total value added (final sale) is ߬̅ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ. However, the actual tax 
rate paid by firm j, denoted by	 ௝߬, depends on the level of evasion and may be lower than ߬̅. 
 
Tax evasion is a costly activity due to potential legal penalties. We allow for the cost to differ 
across firms. The difference in cost of evasion may arise because firms face different levels 
of difficulty in evading taxes. As we will discuss later, one source of such a difference in the 
Ethiopian context could be ownership structure. For example, publicly-traded share 
companies (i.e. firms owned by a large number of shareholders) may need to maintain 
proper accounting records that are available to the public in order to ensure the 
accountability of management to the shareholders. Thus, the need to produce publicly-
verifiable accounting records can make it harder for the management to hide the firm’s 
earnings from the tax authority. On the other hand, family-run businesses do not face the 
																																																													
3 According to CRC Sogema (the firm that developed SIGTAS), the SIGTAS software ‘is designed to meet the needs of 
developing countries who wish to increase their control over state revenue by equipping themselves with computerised 
systems. Since 1996, SIGTAS has been implemented in 24 countries located in Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East, 
Eastern Europe and Asia.’ See <http://crcsogema.com/sigtas-en.html>. 
4		 Boadway and Sato (2009) is one example of several models where firms can avoid taxes by shifting to the informal 
sector. Keen and Mintz (2004) show how firms compromise their productivity by scaling down their activity in order to 
avoid paying VAT.	
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same agency problem (since the owners are also the managers), and may not feel a similar 
level of pressure to produce accounting reports that can be verified by the public. As a result, 
family-run businesses may find it relatively easier to hide their earnings from the tax authority 
than share companies. For simplicity, assume that there are two types of firms: (i) those that 
have a lower cost of evasion and hence evade, and (ii) those that have a prohibitively high 
cost of evasion and hence do not evade. The former ones face an effective tax rate of ߬௘	that 
is less than the statutory rate  ߬ ̅	 while the latter ones pay the statutory rate. The difference ߬̅ െ
߬௘	is the level of evasion by those who can afford to evade. 
 
Consider a simple production technology where output (or total value added) is given by 
 
௝ܻ ൌ ܮ௝ఈ,					ߙ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ 
 
where ܮ௝	is a quantity of input (such as labour) hired by firm j at an exogenously given cost of 
ݓ per unit, which we normalise to one. Without loss of generality, we are assuming that all 
firms have the same level of productivity. The firm chooses the quantity of input ܮ to 
maximise its after-tax profit 
 
ߨ௝൫ܮ௝൯ ൌ ൫1 െ ௝߬൯ܮ௝ఈ െ ܮ௝ 
 
where ௝߬ ∈ ሼ߬௘, ߬ሽ is the actual tax rate faced by the firm (depending on the firm’s ability to 
evade).5 The profit-maximising level of employment, which is given by 
 
ܮ௝∗ ൌ ൫ሺ1 െ ௝߬ሻߙ൯	
భ
భషഀ,                                                        (1) 
 
would be decreasing in the tax rate. The total tax payment by the firm becomes 
 
ܶܽݔ௝ ൌ ௝߬ ௝ܻ ൌ ௝߬൫ሺ1 െ ௝߬ሻߙ൯	
ഀ
భషഀ,                                       (2) 
 
2.2 Impact of ESRMs 
 
If ESRMs minimise tax evasion, we expect the following two patterns in the data. 
 
1. Firms with a high cost of evasion would not be affected by ESRM introduction and their 
tax payment (in Equation 2) does not change. This holds because ESRM introduction 
does not affect the effective tax rate for those firms (as they had been fully complying 
even before ESRM use). 
 
2. Tax payments by firms that have a lower cost of evasion will change following ESRM use 
since their effective tax rate increases. This change is given by 
 
ܶܽݔ௣௢௦௧
ܶܽݔ௣௥௘ ൌ
߬௣௢௦௧
߬௣௥௘ ቆ
1 െ ߬௣௢௦௧
1 െ ߬௣௥௘ ቇ 	
ఈ
ଵିఈ,																																																ሺ3ሻ 
 
where ܶܽݔ௣௥௘ and ܶܽݔ௣௢௦௧	are the total tax payments before and after ESRM use, 
respectively. Likewise, ߬௣௥௘	and ߬௣௢௦௧, respectively, denote the effective tax rates before and 
																																																													
5		 Alternatively, we could consider a firm with a downward-sloping demand curve where the increase in taxes can possibly 
be transferred to consumer prices or, with evasion, pocketed as profits by the firm (see, for example, Boadway and Sato 
(2009) for such a framework). This would not change the conclusion. Notice also that we are treating VAT as a tax on 
the final sale. Thus, we are abstracting from the cascading nature of VAT where firms that paid VAT for their input 
supplies can claim deductions (see, for example, Keen and Mintz (2004) and Boadway and Sato (2009)). Even though 
this cascading nature of VAT may be important in principle, it does not seem to be significantly relevant for the Ethiopian 
case since very few firms actually claimed VAT deductions. 
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after ESRM use. 
 
The difference ߬௣௢௦௧ െ ߬௣௥௘	is the change in the effective tax rate as a result of ESRM use. 
This change has two effects. According to the first term in the right-hand side of Equation 3, 
an increase in the effective tax rate increases tax revenue. However, as captured by the 
second term, this effect may be attenuated due to the endogenous reaction by the firm to 
lower output as a result of the increased tax rate. Thus, assuming that the official tax rate lies 
below the maximum point in the Laffer curve, ESRM use will increase tax payments as long 
as it minimises evasion, that is as long as ߬௣௢௦௧ ൐ ߬௣௥௘. 
 
A direct measure of the impact of ESRM use on tax enforcement would be the change in 
effective tax rate, ߬௣௢௦௧ െ ߬௣௥௘. However, in the data we only observe the tax payments 
ܶܽݔ௣௥௘	and ܶܽݔ௣௢௦௧. Hence, we are only able to estimate the percentage change in tax 
payment (i.e. log(ܶܽݔ௣௥௘/ܶܽݔ௣௢௦௧)) rather than the change in the effective tax rate. Given that 
such an estimate does not account for a possible reduction in output by the firm following 
increased enforcement (as captured by the second term in Equation 3), the estimate is likely 
to be lower than the change in the effective tax rate and should be interpreted as a lower 
bound of the change in the effective tax rate. 
 
 
3  Data description 
 
Our dataset contains the entire set of firms in ERCA’s database. The first key variable in our 
analysis is the amount of VAT paid by firms. We have monthly unbalanced panel 
observations on nearly all those registered for VAT – about 85,000 firms. Our data covers the 
period from January 2003, when VAT was introduced in Ethiopia, to July 2014. 
 
Figure 3 plots the total amount of VAT collected by the government during the ten years 
since introduction of VAT in 2003. The graph presents total VAT both in current and 2003 
prices.6 In nominal terms, the total amount of VAT increased by approximately 10-fold – from 
1.2 billion Birr in 2003 to 13.5 billion Birr in 2013. A large part of this increase is an effect of 
inflation. After adjustment for inflation, total VAT revenue increased by 2.5-fold. 
 
Figure 3 Total VAT revenue (Birr billion) 
 
																																																													
6		 The consumer price index is used to compute VAT in 2003 prices.	
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Figure 4 plots the share of VAT in total domestic tax revenue. Since its introduction VAT has 
constituted a significant share, contributing about 23 per cent of tax revenue in 2003. The 
share reached a peak of 33 per cent. The VAT share has fallen since then, and stood at 20 
per cent in 2011. 
 
Figure 4 VAT (% total domestic tax revenue) 
 
The legislation to implement VAT imposed relatively strict compliance requirements. For 
example, those registered for VAT are required either to issue receipts that are provided only 
by ERCA, or they must use ESRMs. This naturally implies a higher compliance cost both for 
firms to adhere to the requirements and for ERCA to enforce those requirements. As a result, 
the law excluded smaller firms whose turnover was not deemed large enough to justify the 
compliance cost of registering for VAT.7 The law requires all firms whose annual turnover 
exceeds 500,000 Birr to register for VAT. However, in practice identifying the actual amount 
of a firm’s annual turnover is difficult due to potential under-reporting by firms. ERCA is 
legally mandated to judge whether a firm’s annual turnover exceeds the threshold. 
Constrained by limited information about firms’ actual turnover, ERCA typically resorted to 
other ad hoc criteria such as sectors and business locations to proxy for firm size. For 
example, stores operating in major business streets, hotels and jewellery stores are required 
to register for VAT. 
 
VAT implementation has been gradually expanded and continued to include more firms over 
recent years. The solid line in Figure 5 plots the number of VAT-registered taxpayers from 
2003 to 2013. Implementation of VAT started with about 2,500 firms in 2003 and gradually 
expanded, reaching about 51,000 firms in 2013. Initially, ERCA targeted relatively large 
taxpayers to register for VAT. As can be seen in Figure 6, the average VAT per firm 
decreased over time following the expansion of implementation to include relatively smaller 
firms. In fact, initially nearly half VAT revenue was generated by a few large state-owned 
enterprises (see Figure 7). As implementation expanded, private firms ended up contributing 
about 75 per cent of VAT revenue. 
 
  
																																																													
7  For a detailed theoretical discussion on the optimal VAT threshold, see Keen and Mintz (2004). 
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Figure 5 Number of VAT-registered taxpayers and ESRM users (thousand) 
 
Figure 6 Average monthly VAT revenue per firm (Birr thousand) 
 
Figure 7 VAT revenue from government versus non-government firms 
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The second main variable in our analysis is ESRM use. ERCA decides which firms should 
use ESRMs. As was the case with VAT registration, not every firm was required to use 
ESRMs. First, the machines typically cost between 5,000 Birr and 13,000 Birr – a significant 
sum for many businesses in Ethiopia.8 Second, the implementation requires ERCA to have 
the capacity to handle the information system and monitor compliance (that users register 
their transactions with ESRMs). Constrained by both these factors, ERCA expanded the list 
of businesses that are required to use ESRMs over several rounds. 
 
Once ERCA decides that a firm should use ESRMs, the machines are installed at the firm’s 
sales outlets/stores. This is done in the presence of IT technicians from ERCA, who approve 
the installed machines as satisfying the technical requirements/standards set by ERCA. 
 
We have data on whether each firm has started using ESRMs, and, if so, the date on which 
the machines went operational. The implementation of ESRMs started with a few hundred 
firms in 2008 and gradually expanded. In 2013 about 34,000 (of the total 51,000 VAT-
registered taxpayers) used ESRMs (see Figure 5). The introduction of ESRMs was also 
complemented with measures to improve ERCA’s human resources in IT, and its capacity to 
monitor taxpayers’ compliance with registering their transactions with the machines. In 
addition, new laws were introduced to provide for harsher punishments for failing to register 
transactions with ESRMs. 
 
As with VAT registration, ERCA initially targeted relatively large taxpayers for ESRM use, 
and gradually expanded implementation to smaller firms. This is also evident when we look 
at the declining trend in the average VAT per firm among ESRM users (see Figure 8). Notice 
that the mean VAT is larger for ESRM users than for non-users. We also see that the gap in 
the average amount of VAT between ESRM users and non-users declines, possibly as a 
result of more and more relatively smaller firms starting to use ESRMs. 
 
Figure 8 VAT per firm: ESRM users versus non-users (in 2003 prices, Birr thousand) 
 
Table 1 presents an overview of the moments for VAT. A total of 82,579 firms (i.e. including 
those that exited during the sample period) paid VAT during the sample period. Of these, 
58,076 firms (i.e. 70 per cent) have used ESRMs. Once a firm starts using ESRMs, it has to 
continue using them as long as the firm stays in business. Of those 58,076 ESRM users, 
about 58 per cent (i.e. 33,243 firms) paid VAT both before and after starting to use ESRMs. 
																																																													
8  At the current official exchange rate, the amount would be about US$250 to US$650. The figures are based on 
conversations with ERCA officials. 
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The rest of the firms either began using ESRMs from the beginning (so they did not pay VAT 
before using ESRMs), or they began using ESRMs relatively late and have not yet paid VAT 
since using ESRMs. As we will discuss later, our econometric approach involves comparison 
of taxes before and after ESRM use. Hence we limit our analysis to those taxpayers that 
have paid VAT both before and after using ESRMs. We also exclude a few firms that are 
owned by the government.9 This leaves us with 33,158 firms and 738,604 observations for 
the econometric analysis. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics: monthly VAT (Birr thousand) 
 
 Observations Firms Mean Standard 
dev 
Standard 
error 
Sample 1: whole sample      
     Overall 738,604 33,158 57.9 705.0 - 
(1) Pre-ESRM use 317,190 33,158 50.7 483.9 - 
(2) Post-ESRM use 447,135 33,158 63.3 833.5 - 
      Difference: (2) - (1) -  12.6 - 1.7 
Sample II: personally-owned      
      Overall 464,814 25,426 17.8 81.5 - 
(3) Pre-ESRM use 176,271 25,426 13.8 61.8 - 
(4) Post-ESRM use 288,543 25,426 19.0 91.4 - 
     Difference: (4) - (3) -  5.1 - 0.2 
Sample III: institutionally-owned      
     Overall 273,790 7,732 127.3 1,150.7 - 
(5) Pre-ESRM use 140,919 7,732 96.8 720.0 - 
(6) Post-ESRM use 132,871 7,732 159.6 1,473.7 - 
     Difference: (6) - (5) -  62.7 - 4.4 
 
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics of VAT per month (in Birr thousand). The statistics are reported for the whole 
sample as well as two subsamples that differ in ownership type – firms that are owned personally versus institutionally. The 
table also presents comparison of VAT before and after ESRM use. The standard error for the difference between mean of VAT 
before and after ESRM use is reported in the last column. 
 
Descriptive statistics are reported for the whole sample, as well as two subsamples that differ 
in ownership structure. As we will discuss in more detail later, ownership structure may have 
an important implication for tax evasion and the impact of ESRMs. We make a distinction 
between two types of ownership structure: (i) firms that are owned personally, and (ii) those 
that are owned institutionally. The main difference between these two sets of firms relates to 
personal and business liability. Institutionally-owned firms are limited liability entities in the 
sense that claims against those businesses do not extend to the personal property of the 
business owners. This is not the case with personally-owned firms, where business liabilities 
are not distinguished from personal liabilities. That is, in personally-owned firms claims 
against the firm extend to the personal assets of the business owner. 
 
The average monthly VAT stands at 57,866 Birr. The average VAT paid by institutionally-
owned firms is more than ten times that paid by personally-owned firms. This is to be 
expected, given that personally-owned firms are typically family-run small businesses. 
Comparing the amount of VAT paid by firms before and after ESRM use, we see that there is 
an increase for both subsamples. For personally-owned firms, the average VAT increases by 
about 37 per cent (from 13,633 Birr to 18,744 Birr). The increase in percentage terms is 
larger for institutionally-owned firms – standing at 66 per cent (i.e. from 96,478 Birr to 
159,930 Birr). This pattern in the data may present the first hint that the use of ESRMs has 
indeed increased VAT payments. However, the simple mean comparison does not take care 
of several relevant concerns. For example, overall policy changes may confound the 
introduction of ESRM use. The post-ESRM observations are relatively recent ones, and at 
least part of the change is likely to come from time trends from confounding facts (such as 
inflation and firm growth). We will address these concerns more carefully with the 
econometric analysis in the next section. 
																																																													
9  We exclude government-owned firms since we are interested in examining the effect of ESRM use on tax compliance, 
and government-owned firms are less likely to have an incentive to evade taxes. 
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4  Empirical results 
 
In this section we look at empirical evidence of the impact of ESRM use on VAT payments. 
We start with discussion of the econometric approach. We will then present our benchmark 
results. This will be followed by presentation of the effect for two subgroups. As outlined in 
the theoretical discussion, if ESRM use indeed minimises tax evasion, its effect on taxes 
should mainly affect firms that were likely to evade prior to ESRM introduction – that is, firms 
that have a high cost of evasion. We conclude this section with robustness checks of the 
main results. 
 
4.1 Regression specification 
 
We consider the following regression 
 
݈݋݃ܶܽݔ௝,௧ ൌ ෍ߚ௭ܫ௝,௧,௭ ൅ ߤ௝ ൅ ߰௧ ൅ ߝ௝,௧
௭∈௓
																																																ሺ4ሻ	
 
ܶܽݔ௝,௧	is the VAT paid by firm j in time t. ݖܼ߳ ൌ ሼݖ, ݖ ൅ 1, … ,െ2,െ1,1,2, … , ݖ െ 1, ݖሽ 
denotes the number of periods around the beginning of ESRM use. For periods 
preceding/following ESRM use, ݖ	is negative/positive. ܫ௝,௧,௭	is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the number of periods around ESRM use for firm j in time t equals ݖ; otherwise, 
ܫ௝,௧,௭	equals zero. ߤ௝	and ߰௧	are firm and time/month fixed effects, respectively. ߝ௝,௧	is the 
error term. 
 
Our coefficients of interest are the ߚ௭’s. Notice that ߚ௭	can be interpreted as the mean of log 
VAT during quarter ݖ after firm and time effects are partialled out. Thus the coefficients 
capture the dynamics in the amount of tax paid by the firm around the period of ESRM use. If 
ESRM use minimises tax evasion, we expect higher values of ߚ௭ for ݖ	>= 1 (i.e. in the 
aftermath of ESRM use). 
 
A number of remarks are noteworthy about the above regression specification. Inclusion of 
the firm fixed effect implies that our identification strategy relies on variations within the firm. 
In doing so, we avoid a potentially significant source of bias that may arise from relying on 
cross-sectional comparison of groups of firms that used ESRMs with those that did not. Such 
a bias can occur if firms that are required to use ESRMs are systematically different from 
those that are not – a realistic scenario given that ERCA does not randomly select firms to 
use ESRMs. 
 
Our specification, through the inclusion of time fixed effects, is also well-suited to control for 
several potential sources of bias associated with the passage of time. For example, 
aggregate economic trends such as economic growth, government spending and inflation 
may affect both the timing of government’s action on ESRM use and the firms’ revenue. This 
could cause a spurious correlation between ESRM adoption and taxes paid by firms. The 
inclusion of time fixed effects is feasible thanks to the gradual implementation of the 
programme through several rounds (as discussed in Section 3). 
 
Even though the above specification addresses potential biases that may arise from time-
invariant firm factors and aggregate fluctuations, it may not completely address all possible 
sources of bias. For example, if selection into ESRM use is associated with other time-
varying factors that also increase a firm’s revenue/sales, the observed increase in tax 
payments after ESRM use may well be driven by the increase in the firm’s revenue (rather 
than increased compliance). As an illustration, consider a scenario where ERCA’s decision to 
select a firm into ESRM use coincides with faster revenue growth for the firm. Even if the rate 
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of evasion by the firm has not decreased, the total tax payment by the firm may increase 
(following ESRM use) simply because the firm’s revenue has increased. 
 
Unfortunately, we cannot directly address this concern in the econometric specification. 
However, we believe that the observed changes are unlikely to come from such a selection 
effect due to two reasons. First of all, the criteria used by ERCA to roll out ESRM use 
focused on firm characteristics that are unlikely to fluctuate over time. We have looked at 
several directives that ERCA issued over recent years to instruct firms to use ESRMs. The 
directives describe what kind of firms should start using ESRMs. Typically, factors like 
business sectors and location of business activities are used to determine whether a firm 
should start using ESRMs. For example, in one of the rounds, firms operating in main 
business streets were asked to start using ESRMs. In another round large supermarkets, 
restaurants, jewellery stores and hotels operating in Addis Ababa (the capital city) were 
asked to install ESRMs. This is not surprising. ERCA, as is typically the case for a tax 
authority in developing countries, has limited information to track the revenue of each firm – a 
root source of tax evasion. As a result, ERCA resorted to criteria such as location of business 
operation and sectors, a kind of firm-specific criteria that is unlikely to fluctuate over time. 
Thus effects from such selection criteria are expected to be captured by the firm-specific 
fixed effects and are unlikely to bias our estimation. 
 
Secondly, we also take a closer look at the trends in tax payments prior to ESRM use. Once 
we control for firm-specific fixed effects, we do not find any systematic pattern in the data that 
suggests that changes in tax payments after ESRM use are associated with differences that 
existed between firms prior to ESRM use. Figure 9 shows this pattern. It presents 
comparisons of the average VAT for two sets of firms. The averages are computed for 
deviations from firm-specific means. In Figure 9a, we compare the average VAT between 
firms that started using ESRMs during the first quarter of 2010 with ones that did not. We 
look at the average VAT during the twenty-four months preceding January 2010. In Figures 
9b and 9c we do the same comparison, but between firms that started using ESRMs in the 
first quarter of 2011 and 2012 and those that did not. We see that in the lead up to ESRM 
use, firms that started using ESRMs do not appear to show a systematically different trend 
compared to those that did not. Of course, the absence of systematic association between 
timing of ESRM use and the trends prior to ESRM use does not guarantee that any change 
after ESRM use is caused by ESRMs. However, it suggests that the effects are unlikely to be 
caused by pre-existing differences between ESRM users and non-users. 
 
Figure 9 Trends prior to ESRM use: mean log VAT and 95% CI 
 
a. Firms that started using ESRMs during the first quarter of 2010 (thick line) versus firms that did not (thin line) 
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b. Firms that started using ESRMs during the first quarter of 2011 (thick line) versus firms that did not (thin line) 
 
 
c. Firms that started using ESRMs during the first quarter of 2012 (thick line) versus firms that did not (thin line) 
 
4.2 Benchmark result 
 
We estimate Equation 4 using the fixed effects regression. Figure 10 reports the benchmark 
result for the whole sample, consisting of 33,158 firms and 738,604 observations. The graph 
plots the estimated β’s along with the 95 per cent confidence interval (CI). In all our 
estimations we cluster the standard errors by each firm. In the main text, we present all our 
results using graphs (instead of tables) for the sake of brevity. However, more accurate 
figures on the coefficient values and standard errors are given in Table 2 in the Appendix. On 
the horizontal axis of Figure 10, we have the number of quarters around ESRM use.10 
Negative/positive values indicate the number of quarters preceding/following ESRM use. The 
coefficient value for the quarter right before ESRM use, i.e. ߚିଵ, is set to zero (i.e. dropped 
from the regression) so that the estimates for mean of log VAT are expressed relative to the 
mean of log VAT in the period right before ESRM use.11 Notice that there is no significant 
trend prior to the introduction of ESRM use, which implies that potential systematic trends in 
VAT prior to introduction of ESRMs are essentially captured by the firm and time fixed 
effects. 
 
We see that there is a large and statistically significant increase in VAT right after 
introduction of ESRMs. Already in the first quarter after ESRM use, VAT increases by 14 log 
																																																													
10  The quarterly interval is chosen as an intermediate option in the trade-off between minimising noise from using a lower 
frequency (e.g. a year) and capturing the dynamics by using a higher frequency (e.g. a month). However, our results are 
still valid although, not surprisingly, more noisy when we estimate the dynamics from month to month.	
11 	 We report the coefficients for eight quarters (two years) around ESRM use. However, in our estimation we include the 
period indicator dummies, ܫ௭’s, for as long as possible both before and after ESRM use. We limit the report to the two-
year window because a relatively smaller number of firms (less than a quarter of the firms in the whole sample) are 
observed for periods beyond the two-year window. Thus we are less confident to relate the coefficients for wider 
windows with ESRM use (as opposed to changes in the sample composition).	
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points compared to the level right before introduction of ESRMs (which is normalised to 
zero). The increase peaks around the seventh quarter after ESRM use, with an increase of 
about 30 log points. The effect seems to flatten in later periods (with some sign of reversal). 
 
Figure 10 Impact of ESRM use on Log VAT (estimated ࢼࢠ’s and 95% CI) 
 
4.3 Heterogeneous effects 
 
We now turn to the second hypothesis in the theoretical framework – that the firms which had 
a higher cost of evasion, and had not been evading even prior to ESRM use, should not be 
affected by its introduction. To examine the empirical validity of this prediction, one needs to 
distinguish firms that had been complying before ESRM use from those that had not. 
However, by its nature tax evasion is a covert action hence a difficult one to detect. And we 
are not in a position to identify for certain the compliance status of each firm. Nevertheless, 
we try to make some progress by relying on a set of priors, which we base on our reading of 
the institutional context in Ethiopia, about differences in the likelihood of evasion across 
different groups of firms. 
 
We make a distinction between two types of ownership structures: (i) firms that are owned 
personally, and (ii) those that are owned institutionally. We define a firm as institutionally-
owned if it is registered, under Ethiopian law, as a limited liability entity. By limited liability, we 
mean that any claims against the firm do not extend to personal property of the business 
owners. Thus, for example, in the event of default by the firm, the holder of the debt can only 
claim assets registered under the firm. This is not the case with personally-owned firms, 
where business liabilities are not distinguished from personal liabilities. 
 
One may plausibly expect that such a difference in ownership structure can affect a firm’s 
incentive to maintain financial records that are legally verifiable. An institutionally-owned firm 
enters into contracts as an independent financial entity. This means that the firm’s 
creditworthiness in contractual obligations (such as loan or merchandise delivery contracts) 
is likely to depend on the firm’s ability to present a legally verifiable record of its financial 
state. That is, if an institutionally-owned firm does not have a legally verifiable record, a 
creditor would be less able to put an effective claim on the firm’s assets. On the other hand, 
the creditworthiness of a personally-owned firm is likely to be linked to the owner’s personal 
creditworthiness. This is the case because a creditor can file claims against personal assets 
of the owner in the event of default by a personally-owned firm. Thus, a personally-owned 
firm can maintain a relatively higher creditworthiness despite the opacity of its records of the 
firm’s financial state, because the business records may not necessarily tarnish the owner’s 
personal creditworthiness. This would be the case, for example, if an owner has a relatively 
large amount of personal wealth registered outside the firm that a creditor can claim in the 
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event of default by the firm. Arguably, this dependence of the creditworthiness of an 
institutionally-owned firm on a legally verifiable financial record is more likely to make it 
harder for the firm to evade taxes, since the same record can be used by the tax authority to 
trace the firm’s revenue. By the same token, personally-owned firms can find it relatively 
easier to evade taxes because they can still keep a relatively healthy creditworthiness 
(depending on the owner’s personal creditworthiness) despite the lack of a reliable financial 
record of the firm’s business activity. 
 
There are also other plausible reasons why institutionally-owned firms may find it harder to 
evade taxes. Institutionally-owned firms typically tend to be large in size and to have many 
owners (like shareholder companies and cooperatives). As opposed to firms owned 
personally, which are usually owned and run by families, the managers of share companies 
are not necessarily the owners. Instead, shareholder companies are typically managed by 
professional managers who act as agents of the shareholders – an agency relationship that 
necessitates the need for availability of verifiable information to shareholders about the 
performance of the managers. This information is partly available in the form of relatively 
reliable accounting records on earnings by the firm. Availability of such information for a large 
number of shareholders, usually released in public, makes it difficult for the managers to hide 
their earnings from the tax authority. Moreover their relatively larger size makes them a 
valuable source of revenue for the government. This revenue potential in turn provides the 
tax authority with more incentive to monitor their compliance closely. In fact, many 
developing countries have a special enforcement unit – commonly known as a large taxpayer 
unit – within their tax administration that is dedicated to handling large taxpayers (Baer 
2002). This is also true in Ethiopia, and this probably made it harder for institutionally-owned 
firms to evade taxes even prior to ESRM use. 
 
Figure 11 presents the estimated impact of ESRM use from two regressions – one for each 
set of firms. The top panel depicts the estimated coefficients for the personally-owned firms, 
while the bottom one shows the coefficients for institutionally-owned ones. For the sake of 
brevity, the coefficient for the quarter right before ESRM use, ߚିଵ, is normalised to 0 in both 
of the regressions.12 Consistent with our discussion above, for institutionally-owned firms the 
VAT trend does not appear to show any change in the aftermath of ESRMs. This is not the 
case for personally-owned firms. We observe a large and significant break in the VAT trend 
following ESRM use. Right after ESRM use, VAT for personally-owned firms increases by 
about 18 log points. This increase is larger than that found for the whole sample (14 log 
points), suggesting that the results for the whole sample are driven by personally-owned 
firms. 
 
  
																																																													
12   That is, the indicator dummy for quarter -1 (ܫିଵ	in Equation 4) is dropped from the regression. This does not affect the 
results since the results do not depend on a particular choice of normalisation. 
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Figure 11 Impact of ESRM use on Log VAT (estimated ࢼࢠ’s and 95% CI) 
 
 
a. Personally-owned firms 
 
 
b. Institutionally-owned firms 
 
4.4 Robustness checks 
 
We undertake two sets of robustness checks that pertain to two major concerns with the 
above regressions. 
 
The first concern in our specification is differential time trends. We allowed for time fixed 
effects, which controls for potential confounding aggregate variables. However, the time fixed 
effects do not account for variations in time trends across subsets of firms. For example, 
firms in different regions may have different time trends. And if ESRM use is expanded 
across regions in a non-random pattern, the differential time trends across regions may bias 
our estimated effect. This is a reasonable concern given that ESRM use was first rolled out 
primarily to businesses within the capital city, and only expanded later to regions outside the 
capital. To some extent this concern does not seem worrisome given that we did not see any 
major systematic difference between firms that had just started using ESRMs and those that 
had not (see the discussion on Figure 9). However, as a further robustness check we make 
use of the information on the administrative unit of the firms’ location in the dataset. We run 
regressions allowing for district-specific time effects (for eighty-one districts). The R-squared 
increases substantially from a low of 9 per cent up to 70 per cent, implying a substantial 
variation in time trends across districts. However, as can be seen from Figure 12, the results 
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are robust for this specification. This indicates that the implementation of ESRMs is unlikely 
to be associated with district-specific time variations. We also run the regressions controlling 
for district-specific linear time trends and find similar results (not reported). 
 
Figure 12 Impact of ESRM use on Log VAT (estimated ࢼࢠ’s and 95% CI): controlling for 
district-specific time trends 
 
a. All firms 
 
 
b. Personally-owned firms 
 
 
c. Institutionally-owned firms 
 
A further issue relates to potentially differential time trends across sectors (rather than 
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regions) in a way that variations in time trends correlate with the implementation of ESRMs. 
Our dataset contains relatively detailed information on business types (or sectors). There are 
193 types of sectors in the data.13 Thus, we also check the robustness of our results in 
controlling for sector-specific time effects. We find that the results are still the same (not 
reported). 
 
The second concern relates to the composition of our sample. As discussed in Section 3, 
both the number of those registered for VAT and ESRM users have been increasing over 
time. ERCA has been gradually expanding the list of firms that should pay VAT as well as 
those that should use ESRMs (see Figure 5). Thus even if we present VAT trends for a two-
year window (eight quarters) around the beginning of ESRM use, not all the firms in our 
sample are observed during the entire period in the two-year window. Some of them started 
paying VAT relatively recently, hence they have not been in the tax record long enough to be 
observed for two years before ESRM use. Similarly, some firms started using ESRMs 
relatively recently, and hence they have not used ESRMs long enough to be observed for 
two years of ESRM use. This means that the number of firms with non-missing values 
decreases as we move further away from the beginning of ESRM use (i.e. as ݖ in Equation 4 
goes further from zero). Hence part of the observed dynamics in the periods around the 
beginning of ESRM use could be a result of this change in composition of firms, rather than 
the actual effect of ESRM use.  
 
In order to address this concern, we run the regression including only the firms that are 
observed for at least a year before and a year after ESRM use (i.e. a total of two years). This 
would ensure that, for at least within a one-year window around the beginning of ESRM use, 
the dynamic is not affected by changes in composition of the firms. This results in a drop in 
the sample size: from 33,158 firms and 738,604 observations in the whole sample, to 13,525 
firms and 449,577 observations. The decline in the number of firms is much more 
pronounced than the decline in number of observations because the firms in the dropped 
sample have been observed for a shorter time. The two major patterns that we found in the 
earlier regressions – that there is a significant increase following ESRM use and that this 
effect is primarily driven by personally-owned firms – remain intact when we limit the sample 
to firms that are observed for at least a year. As a further robustness check, we also run the 
regressions including only firms that are observed for at least two years before and after 
ESRM use (i.e. four years in total). Our sample size falls further to 336,164 observations and 
7,860 firms. The two main results still hold. This finding suggests that the effect in the 
aftermath of ESRM use is not a result of changes in the sample composition. 
 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
The limited fiscal capacity of a state has received increased attention as an important 
constraint to economic development. Building fiscal capacity is not a costless endeavour. It 
requires an administrative infrastructure that is capable of gathering, analysing and 
monitoring earnings information on a large number of taxpayers. Thus the use of electronic 
systems has attracted governments in many developing countries as a relatively cheaper 
alternative for monitoring earnings information and improving their fiscal capacity. In this 
study we document the first empirical evidence of one such policy experiment using 
microdata from Ethiopia. 
 
We find that tax payments by firms increase in the aftermath of ESRM use. Analysis of 
trends prior to ESRM use suggests that the effect is unlikely to be caused by pre-existing 
																																																													
13   The business type categories are based on ERCA’s definition and do not necessarily coincide with standard 
categorisations (like the sector/industry divisions of the United Nations). 
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differences in trends. We also find that the effect is driven primarily by personally-owned 
firms, which we believe are more likely to evade taxes. We find no effect for firms that are 
institutionally-owned. This result suggests that ESRM use minimised evasion among firms 
that were more likely to evade taxes. 
 
By and large, the results in this paper suggest that the use of ESRMs has increased tax 
compliance by the firms that used ESRMs. Thus the evidence points to a possible positive 
contribution of the IT revolution to fiscal capacity in developing countries. However, this 
conclusion comes with an important qualification. We estimated the effect on firms that were 
already registered for VAT – a relatively small fraction of the firms in Ethiopia. If increased 
enforcement via ESRM use forces firms to operate underground – where the government 
cannot require them to use ESRMs – the revenue gains from ESRM use may be attenuated 
due to increased informality. The extent to which increased enforcement through ESRM use 
leads to a higher level of informality should be an interesting agenda for future research. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2 Impact of ESRM use on VAT 
 
Ownership type Model with aggregate time fixed effects Model with district-specific time fixed 
effects 
 Both Personal Institutional Both Personal Institutional 
# of quarters around 
ESRM use: 
      
-8 -0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.14a 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
-0.14b 
(0.06) 
-7 -0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.10 
(0.06) 
-0.09b 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.10c 
(0.05) 
-6 -0.07c 
(0.04) 
-0.14a 
(0.05) 
-0.10b 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.13b 
(0.06) 
-0.11b 
(0.05) 
-5 -0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.08b 
(0.04) 
-0.09b 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.09c 
(0.05) 
-0.10b 
(0.04) 
-4 -0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.06c 
(0.03) 
-0.11a 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.07c 
(0.04) 
0.12a 
(0.04) 
-3 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.07a 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.07b 
(0.03) 
-2 -0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.04b 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.05b 
(0.02) 
       
1 0.14a 
(0.01) 
0.18a 
(0.01) 
0.06a 
(0.02) 
0.15a 
(0.01) 
0.19a 
(0.01) 
0.06a 
(0.02) 
2 0.22a 
(0.02) 
0.28a 
(0.02) 
0.12a 
(0.02) 
0.22a 
(0.02) 
0.31a 
(0.02) 
0.11a 
(0.03) 
3 0.24a 
(0.02) 
0.31a 
(0.03) 
0.14a 
(0.03) 
0.26a 
(0.03) 
0.37a 
(0.04) 
0.14a 
(0.03) 
4 0.27a 
(0.03) 
0.35a 
(0.04) 
0.19a 
(0.03) 
0.29a 
(0.04) 
0.42a 
(0.05) 
0.19a 
(0.04) 
5 0.26a 
(0.04) 
0.34a 
(0.05) 
0.19a 
(0.04) 
0.29a 
(0.05) 
0.42a 
(0.06) 
0.19a 
(0.05) 
6 0.28a 
(0.05) 
0.37a 
(0.06) 
0.21a 
(0.05) 
0.31a 
(0.05) 
0.47a 
(0.07) 
0.21a 
(0.06) 
7 0.30a 
(0.05) 
0.39a 
(0.07) 
0.23a 
(0.05) 
0.34a 
(0.06) 
0.53a 
(0.08) 
0.21a 
(0.06) 
8 0.29a 
(0.06) 
0.41a 
(0.08) 
0.21a 
(0.06) 
0.34a 
(0.07) 
0.56a 
(0.09) 
0.20a 
(0.07) 
Observations 738,604 464,814 273,790 738,604 464,814 273,790 
Firms 33,158 25,426 7,732 33,158 25,426 7,732 
R2 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.69 0.67 0.63 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Aggregate time fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
District-specific fixed 
effects 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: This table presents the estimated impact of ESRM use. The results are reported for the whole sample of firms and two 
subsamples that differ in ownership type. The first three columns control for firm and time fixed effects. The last three columns 
control for firm fixed effects and district-specific time effects. Standard errors clustered by the firm are in parentheses. The left-
most column presents the number of quarters around ESRM use. Negative/positive values indicate the number of quarters 
before/after ESRM use. The coefficient on quarter −1, i.e. the quarter right before ESRM use, is normalised to zero. 
a significant at the 1 per cent level, b significant at the 5 per cent level, c significant at the 10 per cent level.  
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